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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
ROBERT K. DUSENBERRY and 
EDITH 'C. DUSENBERRY, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, and Appellants, 
vs. 
TAYLOR'S, a corporation, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to 1954, Mr. and Mrs. G. L. Miller had purchased 
numerous items on open account credit at Taylor's Inc., a 
Provo, Ultah, department store, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). In 
July, 1954, Mr. G. L. Miller purchased wall to wall carpet-
ing, pad, tile, and linoleum to be installed in a new home 
and on July 9, 1954, the carpeting and pad and the labor 
charges for installing were charged out to G. L. Miller on 
open account. Credit was approved for Taylor's Inc., by 
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one who initialed the charge slip by the letters "pm", 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9). On July 26, 1954, the Millers pUT-
chased a crib, playpen and mattress, and on that day they 
paid $10.00 on their aocount. On August 30, they paid 
$23.00, which was duly credited to the accounts receivable 
ledger, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). During the months of July 
and August, 1954, they also purchased numerous items of 
furniture, consisting of bedroom set, lamps, breakfast set, 
bedroom screen, sofa and chair covers, and also had the 
linoleum and tile laid upon the floor of their horne. All of 
these items were charged to G. L. Miller on open account, 
and are listed on the accounts receivable ledger, (Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit 1). On August 31, 1954, a payment of $300.00 
was credited to the open account, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). 
On September 1, 1954, they purchased a 'bedspread, and it 
w.as charged to "G. L. Miller" and again credit was ap-
proved by "P.M." and it was charged on the open account, 
(Page 2 of Defendant's Exhibit 8 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
1). 
It was the practice of Taylor's Inc., to mark the charge 
slips with the word '',Contract'' if the charge was to be 
other than on open account, (Tr. 25). None of the above 
mentioned sales were so stamped or marked, (Exhibits 
P-9 ·and Page 2 of D-8). Mr. G. L. Miller had been inter-
viewed for ·credit on or about July 10, 1954, by "P.M.", (De-
fendant's Exhibit 7). 
After September 1, ··and prior to September 9, 1954, 
the Milers purchased drapes from Taylor's Inc. These 
items were marked "Contract" and credit was not ap-
proved by "P.M.", (Defendant's Exhibit 8, Pages 1, 3 and 
4) '' and on septembe·r 9th, 1954, the drapery items were 
charged to a riotes receivable account, (Page 2., PlaintiffS' 
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Exhibit 1). Also, on September 9, .1954, an entry was made 
on the accounts receivable ledger, "Trans to Note $1,962.78" 
and the open account was thereby balanced as of that date, 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). At the same time an entry was 
made on the notes receivable ledger, "Trans from acct. 
$1,962.78". (Page 2, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). On that same 
date Taylor's Inc., secured a promissory norte in the amournt 
of $2,685.71, including finance charges of $132.21 and which 
said note also indicated that the sum of $2,553.50 was ''trans. 
acct.", Plaintiffs' Exhibit P-2). Although all of the char-
ges had been to "G. L. Miller", (Defendant's Exhibit 8 and 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9) , the note was signed only by "Eva 
K. Miller", (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2). On the everse side of 
the note, among other conditions, it was recited, "1. Title 
to the property ·mentioned herein shall remain in Taylor's 
until the purchaser pays this note in full and complies with 
all other ·conditions to be performed by him." 
In the month of July, 1955, the plaintiffs, Major Robert 
K. Dusenberry, United States Air Force, and his wife, Edith 
C. Dusenberry, were seeking a home in the Provo area. 
Under date of July 25, 1955, they received a letter from 
Mrs. G. L. Miller offering to sell the Miller home and recit-
ing among other things that "The home could be available 
for you by August 15," and that "It is carpeted and draped", 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5). On August 30, 1955, they obtained 
a warranty deed from Eva K. Miller, (P-3) and on that 
same date gave a mortgage on the property to State Sav-
ings & Loan Association for $12,500.00, (Plaintiffs' Ex-
.rubit 4>. 
Mrs. Dusenberry and her children lived in the home 
from that time until the 15th day of September, 1956, when 
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she and her husband leased the home to Mr. and Mrs. John 
W. Manning and gave the Mannings an option to purchase 
the property, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6) . 
Mr. and Mrs. Dusenberry did not acquire any furni-
ture from Eva K. Miller, and at the time they took posses-
sion orf the property part of the drapes had been removed. 
Never at any time while the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Dusen-
berry, occupied the premises did they know that the de-
fendant, Taylor's Inc., claimed title to the carpeting, lin-
oleum, tile or drapes, (Tr. 4). Sometime after Mr. and 
Mrs. Manning took possession of the property a represen-
tative of Taylor's Inc., called at the home and told Mrs. 
Manning that the carpeting, linoleum and tile on the floors 
and the drapes belonged to the Company, (Tr. 26). Tay-
lor's Inc., first manifested an alleged title to these items 
only after they had learned that Mr. G. L. Miller had taken 
out· bankruptcy in the state of California, (Tr. 33). Mr. 
Miller had gone to California prior to the time that Mrs. 
Miller offered to sell the house· to the plaintiffs. 
After the plaintiffs leased the premises to Mr. and Mrs. 
Manning they moved to the state of Texas, where Mr. Du-
senberry was ~and is on active duty with the U. S. Air Force. 
After plaintiffs learned of the defendant's claim they filed 
a suit for a Declaratory Judgment against the defendant, 
Taylor's Inc. .. 
The case was· heard by the Honorable Maurice Har-
ding in the Fourth Judicial District Court in Utah County, 
and :this appeal is from his Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment, entered in favor of the defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND HOLDING 
THAT TITLE TO THE CARPETING, TILE AND LINO-
LEUM WAS STILL VESTED IN DEFENDANT. 
POINT II 
THE ALLEGEJD CONDITIO·NAL SALES CONTRACT 
IS IN.VALID AND UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT 
DOES NOT MEET THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. 
POINT III 
THE RIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFFS, AS PURCHAS-
ERS OF THE REALTY WITHO~UT NOTICE OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S CUAIM TO FIXTURES, ARE UNAF-
FECTED BY THJE DEFEND\ANT'S CLAIM OF TITLE 
THERETO. 
POINT IV 
RUSSELL v. HARKNESS IS NOT AUTHORITY ON 
THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE. 
THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND H01LDING 
THAT TITLE TO THE CARPETING, TILE AND LINO-
LEUM WAS STILL VESTED IN DEFENDANT. 
The ledger sheet shows a series of open account tran-
sactions consisting of charges and credits extending from 
October 27, 1951, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). That account, 
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in the name of Mrs. G. L. Miller, was balanced by an entry 
"Trans. to note" on August 31, 1953, (P-1). In July of 
1954, a earpeting job amounting to $1,267.32 was charged 
out to G. L. Miller, credit was approved by "P'M.", (P-9) 
and that amount was entered on the accounts reseivable 
ledger, (P-1). On that same day a credit of $300.00 was 
also entered, (P-1). All of the items involved in these tran-
sactions ·had been charged out to G. L. Miller, (Exhibits D-8 
and P-9); ;however, Mr. G. L. Miller did not sign the con-
tract upon which defendant relies, (Exhibit P-2. 
The foregoing clearly shows that title passed from the 
defendant to G. L. Miller, and that defendant, by the devise 
of the alleged title retaining note later obtained from Eva 
K. Miller, attempted to regain title for its own security. At 
most, such a contract could amount only to an instrument 
in the nature of a chattel mortgage, which was required 
to be filed of record before it became binding on an inno-
cent purchaser for value. An absolute sale may not sub-
sequently be converted into a conditional sale by the writ-
ten agreement of the parties without change of possession, 
at least where it would be to the prejudice of a subsequent 
purchaser of the vendee without notice of the agreement. 
Van Winkle v. Crowell, 146 U. S. 42, 13 S. Ct. 18. 
The chief criterion for determining the character of 
the transaction is the intention of the parties as disclosed 
by the entire contract, the circumstances attending the 
transaction, and the conduct of the parties. 47 Am. Jur 17. 
w·hile defendant did not see fit to introduce all of the sales 
slips for the various items entered on the accounts receiv-
able ledger, the one that was introduced, being the $1,-
267.00 carpet item, shows a simple charge to G. L. Miller 
on the 9th day of July, 1954, with credit approved for the 
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company by "P.M.", (P-9). Defendant's witness, Mr. Steed-
man, stated that his company made a distinction between 
sales to be made on open accorunt and those to be put on 
a contract, and that sales to be put on contract were stamped 
"contract"., (Tr. 24-25). None of the sales made prior 
to September 3, 1954, were so stan1ped, (Page 2 of D-8 and 
P-9) , and all of these items were posted to the accounts re-
ceivable ledger, (P-1). Sales made on and after Septem-
ber 3, 19·54, appear to have been stamped "contract", (Pages 
1, 3 and 4 of D-8), and were posted to the notes receivable 
ledger. On September 9, 1954, the balance owing on the 
open account was transferred to the note ledger, (Page 2 
of P-1), and on the same date that the norte was executed, 
(P-2). 
All of the charges were made to G. L. Miller, (D-8 and 
P-9), and G. L~. Miller \Vas the person named as credit ap-
plicant, (D-7). G. L. Miller, however, did not sign the note, 
(P-2). 
Where property was delivered to purchaser, and there 
was no previous contract retaining title in seller, the fact 
that the delivery slip contained the words "conditional sale, 
title retained by vendor until paid in full" was held nort suf-
ficient to shO'W' a conditional sale. Utah Association of 
Credit Men v. BuDer, 57 Utah 270, 194 Pac. 127. 
The devise of a conditional sale contract has severe 
remedial incidents, and is not favored in the law. ·Such a 
contract must be elearly proved, and the courts tend to 
resolve doubts as to whether a transaction is a conditional 
sale or chattel mortgage in favor of the latter construction. 
47 Am. Jur. 6, Paragraph 827. 
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POINT II 
THE ALLEGED CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT 
IS INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT 
DOES NOT MEET THE STATUTO·RY REQUIREMENTS. 
The laws of the State of Utah with respect to condi-
tional sales were amended in 1953, to require, among other 
things, that every conditional sales contract for the time 
sale of tangible personal property, be signed by both the 
buyer and the seller. 15-1-2a (10-b), U. C. A. 1953, as 
amended by Chapter 24, Paragraph 2, Laws of Utah, 1953. 
The contract here considered is not signed by either G. L. 
Miller or the seller and, therefore, does not even purport 
to meet the statutory requirement. The requirments of 
such statute are mandatory, and compliance therewith is 
indispensable. 47 Am. Jur. 40, and authorities there cited. 
POINT ill 
THE RIGHT O·F THE PLAINTIFFS, AS PURCHAS-
ERS O·F THE REALTY WITHOUT NOTICE OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM TO FIXTURES, ARE UNAF-
FECTED BY TH1E DE·FENDANT'S CLAIM OF TITLE 
THERETO. 
It was well known to the defendant at the time it sold 
and installed the linoleum, tile and wall-to-wall carpeting 
involved in this ~case that it would be permanently attached 
to the house, and that upon a resale it would pass as a part 
of the real estate. The conditional vendor of chattels at-
tached to realty has repeatedly been held to be without 
right of recovery of the fixtures~ as against a subsequent 
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purchaser of the realty without notice of the existence of 
the conditional sale. Annotation 141 ALR 1284. 
POINT IV 
RUSSELL v. HARKNESS IS NOT AUTHORITY O·N 
THJE F ACfS OF THE PRESENT ·CASE. 
The Uta:h ·case, Russell v. Harkness, 4 Utah 197, 7 Pac. 
865 Aff'd 118 U. S. 663, cited by the defendant and reHed 
upon by the trial court, is entirely different ~rom the in-
·stant case. In that case the seller was the owner of ,and 
had possession of the equipment at the time the eonditional 
sale agreement ·was executed. The vendee took possession 
after the a~eement was made. In addition, the purchaser 
from the conditional vendee, at the time of purchase, knew 
that the equipment had not been paid for and knew that 
the conditional vendor claimed title thereto. It was not a 
situation where a sale on open account was later changed 
to a conditional sale without redelivery of possession to the 
vendor, as in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court erred in ·holding that title to the items 
in question was vested in defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALDRICH & BULLOCK 
35 No. Utniv. Ave. 
Provo, Uta:h 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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